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Abstract12
This paper further develops a new way of modelling evolutionary game mod-13
els with an emphasis on ecological realism, concerned with how ecological factors14
determine payo¤s in evolutionary games. Our paper is focused on the impact of15
strategically neutral growth limiting factors and background tness components16
on game dynamics and the form of the stability conditions for the rest points17
constituted by the intersections of the frequency and density nullclines. It is18
shown that for the density dependent case, that at the stationary state, the19
turnover coe¢ cients (numbers of newborns per single dead adult) are equal for20
all strategies. In addition, the paper contains a derivation of the EESS (eco-21
evolutionarily stable states) conditions, describing evolutionary stability under22
limited population growth. We show that evolutionary stability depends on the23
local geometry (slopes) of the intersecting nullclines. The paper contains exam-24
ples showing that density dependence induces behaviour which is not compatible25
with purely frequency dependent static game theoretic ESS stability conditions.26
We show that with the addition of density dependence, stable states can become27
unstable and unstable states can be stabilised. The stability or instability of28
the rest points can be explained by a mechanism of eco-evolutionary feedback.29
1 Introduction30
Current developments in evolutionary biology emphasize the role of relationships31
between selection mechanisms and ecological factors (Schoener 2011, Morris32
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2011, Pelletier.et al. 2009). This perspective is very interesting from the point33
of view of formal modelling, which can contribute to this research program not34
only by quantitative predictions, but also by rigorous conceptualization of the35
analyzed mechanisms. Thus, this direction should also be considered in the36
development of modelling approaches such as evolutionary game theory. Recent37
developments in this eld, focused on the realistic modelling of the turnover of38
individuals (i.e. the dynamics of the replacement of the dying adult individuals39
by newly introduced juveniles), can be useful in pursuing this goal. In this study40
we will analyze the interplay between selection dynamics of strategy frequencies41
and the ecological dynamics shaping the population size. In addition we will42
investigate the relationships between game theoretic equilibrium conditions and43
nullclines of the selection and ecological dynamics.44
In the classical approach to evolutionary game theory (Maynard Smith 1982,
Hofbauer and Sigmund 1988, 1998), a well-mixed population with clonal repro-
duction and no mutation evolves under natural selection. The strategies are
heritable phenotypic traits or di¤erent behavioral patterns and payo¤ functions
describing their tness. The merits and limitations of such an approach are
discussed in Maynard Smith (1982) (for interesting general work based upon
similar principles but with an innite strategy set, see for example Gorban,
2007; Meszena et al., 2006; Oesschler and Riedel, 2001). An abstract tness
is expressed as an innitesimal growth rate r and described in undened units,
which are the currency in which evolutionary costsand benetsare counted.
The basic model of the game dynamics of k competing strategies are replicator
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dynamics, dened on the k 1 dimensional simplex. Then qi = ni=
P
j nj (ni is
the number of carriers of the i-th strategy) is the frequency of the i-th strategy
and ri(q) is its payo¤ function:
_qi = qi
0@ri(q) X
j
rj(q)
1A for i = 1; : : : ; k   1: (1)
In the classical approach to evolutionary game modelling there is no explicit45
analysis of the impact of limitations of the population size. In more complex46
approaches (Cressman 1992, Cressman et al 2001, Cressman and Garay 2003,47
Argasinski 2006) density dependence has been taken into consideration. The48
specic case of selectively neutral density dependence, which means that the49
growth suppression acts on all strategies in the same way, was analyzed in50
Argasinski and Koz÷owski (2008). It was shown there that the classical approach51
(1) can be problematic, when growth limitation, related to the logistic equation,52
is implemented. The dynamics stop when the carrying capacity is reached. This53
is caused by the fact that both birth and death rates are suppressed, leading54
to a population of immortal individuals. This problem can be solved by using55
the assumption that only the birth rate is suppressed by juvenile recruitment56
survival, which leads to a generalization of the replicator dynamics completed57
by the equation for the population size (Argasinski and Broom, 2012). In this58
approach payo¤s are described explicitly as demographic vital rates (mortality59
and fertility), not as an abstract tness. Thus assume that Wi(q) is the fertility60
function, suppressed by the density dependent juvenile recruitment function61
(1   n=K) (where n = Pj nj and K is the carrying capacity describing the62
maximal population load, Hui, 2006), and di(q) = 1 si(q) is the adult mortality.63
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This leads to the following:64
_qi = qi
240@Wi(q) X
j
Wj(q)
1A1  n
K

 
0@di(q) X
j
dj(q)
1A35 for i = 1; : : : ; k   1:(2)
_n = n
0@1  n
K
X
j
Wj(q) 
X
j
dj(q)
1A ; (3)
65
where the bracketed term from (1) splits into two brackets describing di¤er-66
ences in fertilities and mortalities. The replicator system (2) is completed by67
equation (3) describing the changes of the population size caused by selection of68
the strategies. A similar method was applied in a number of papers (Hauert et69
al., 2006; Hauert et al., 2008; Argasinski and Koz÷owski, 2008; Zhang and Hui,70
2011; Argasinski and Broom, 2012; Huang et al., 2015; Gokhale and Hauert,71
2016). In this approach population size does not converge to an arbitrary car-72
rying capacity as in many models (for example Cressman and Krivan, 2010;73
Krivan, 2013) but to a dynamic equilibrium between mortality and fertility74
(this is often called an emergent carrying capacity, Bowers et al., 2003; Sieber75
et al., 2014). The general selective properties of this approach were presented in76
Argasinski and Broom (2013), where the simplied version of (2,3) with payo¤s77
as constants was analyzed. It was shown there that when the population reaches78
the close neighbourhood of the population size equilibrium (nullcline of the equa-79
tions for n), then newborns form the pool of candidates from which individuals80
replacing the dead adults in their nest sites will be drawn. This mechanism81
was termed the "nest site lottery". This process promotes the strategies that82
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maximize the number of newborns replacing each single dying adult (termed83
"turnover coe¢ cient"), however among strategies maximizing this quantity it is84
protable to maximize the mortality (the number of dead adults) and thus also85
the number of newborns replacing them. Therefore, we have a two stage tness86
measure.87
The previous paper, Argasinski and Broom (2012), was focused on the de-88
scription of the above approach using demographic parameters, mortality as the89
probability of death (or equivalently survival) and fertility as per capita number90
of o¤spring. This allows for a description of the abstract and unclear parame-91
ters such as tnessor growth rateby clear and measurable parameters. In92
addition, the new approach is focused on the detailed description of the struc-93
ture of cause-e¤ect chains underlying the particular interactions. For example,94
the modelled interaction described by the game theoretic structure can be com-95
posed of several mortality and fertility stages following each other. This aspect96
can be illustrated by the simplest case of a single pre-reproductive mortality97
stage preceding the fertility stage. Then only survivors of the interaction can98
reproduce, which should be incorporated into the payo¤ functions. Thus the99
fertility payo¤s Wi(q) will be replaced by the mortality-fertility trade-o¤ func-100
tion Vi(q) =
P
j qjsi(ej)Wi(ej) (where ej is the vector describing the j-th pure101
strategy) describing the reproductive success of the survivors. The new concep-102
tual framework was applied to the classical Hawk-Dove game to illustrate the103
advantages over the classical approach.104
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The general framework was claried in a second paper (Argasinski and105
Broom, submitted) focused on the derivation of the game theoretic model from106
the general population dynamics model also describing factors other than the107
modelled type of interaction. For example individuals playing the Hawk-Dove108
game during the mating conict (the modelled focal interaction) can also be109
killed by predators (background interactions without relation to the strategies110
in the focal game). This leads to a model of a population of individuals playing111
di¤erent types of games describing di¤erent interactions occurring at di¤erent112
rates (see Appendix 1 for more details). Thus, by analogy with chemical kinetics113
(Upadhyay, 2006), the game theoretic structure is equivalent to stoichiometric114
coe¢ cients describing the outcomes of a single reaction between particles (in our115
case, interactions between individuals) and the rate of occurrence is equivalent116
to the reaction rate. The new framework focuses on births and deaths (described117
by separate payo¤ functions) as the aggregated outcomes of the physical inter-118
actions between individuals and the elements of the environment. This is why119
it was described as the event-based approach in the previous papers. This120
approach is focused on the development of the mechanistic interpretations of the121
theoretical notions which was emphasized by Geritz and Kisdi (2012). However,122
in game theoretic analysis we are interested in one particular type of interac-123
tion referred as a focal game (or a few chosen types a¤ected by an analyzed124
phenotypic trait in a more general case) while the aggregated outcomes of the125
other games will constitute the background tness. In e¤ect (3) should be com-126
pleted by the background fertility  (1  n=K) and the background mortality127
7
	 (see Appendix 1 for details). In addition, thenest site lotteryoperates not128
only on the demographic outcomes of the modelled game, but on outcomes of129
all interactions, which means that the aggregated fertility outcomes of events130
constituting the background tness (other games played by individuals) are also131
the subject of this mechanism.132
The values of the background payo¤s can seriously a¤ect the game dynam-133
ics as shown in Argasinski and Broom (submitted). In Argasinski and Broom134
(2012) it was also shown that under the inuence of neutral density dependence,135
the behaviour of the system is di¤erent from that in the model with unlimited136
growth. The main di¤erence is that in the model with unlimited growth there137
are only equations describing the evolution of strategy frequencies, while in the138
density dependent model there is an additional equation describing the size of139
the population and fertilities are a¤ected by juvenile mortality described by140
logistic suppression. In e¤ect, in the density dependent model, the stable fre-141
quency becomes a function of n describing the nullcline constituting the manifold142
of game theoretic Nash equilibria (population states with equal growth rates for143
all strategies). In addition, the equation for the population size leads to another144
nullcline being a function of the population composition and is a¤ected by back-145
ground payo¤s. This nullcline has a very important biological meaning since it146
describes the ecological equilibria, conditional on the current strategic compo-147
sition. In the game theoretic literature it is often referred as the stationary148
density surface (Cressman et al., 2001; Cressman and Garay, 2003a; Cressman149
and Garay, 2003b). Thus, the global stationary states are intersections of these150
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nullclines, which can be stable or unstable.151
The density and frequency nullclines describing the ecological and game152
theoretic equilibria are important for the mechanistic interpretation of the phe-153
nomenon in terms of feedbacks. New phenomena can emerge, for example the154
existence of a stable pure Hawk solution in addition to the stable mixed equilib-155
rium (Argasinski and Broom, 2012). The additional stable rest point is caused156
by neutral density dependence. This paper contains a general analysis of system157
stability and a mechanistic explanation of the interplay between the conver-158
gence to the selection equilibrium describing the stable population composition159
(described by the frequency nullcline) and the convergence to the ecological160
equilibrium describing the stable population size (described by the density null-161
cline). The study shows when the stability is fully determined by the behaviour162
along the nullclines and the problem can be reduced to the static game theo-163
retic analysis limited to simple algebraic inequalities, and when the full dynamic164
model involving di¤erential equations should be applied.165
2 Results166
2.1 Selectively neutral density dependence and the con-167
cept of eco-evolutionary feedback168
Now let us focus on the impact of selectively neutral density dependence act-169
ing as juvenile mortality. The Hawk-Dove example presented in Argasinski and170
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Broom (2012) is a case where there is a single equation for strategy frequen-171
cies, and the space of the population composition is the unit interval. We are172
interested in the rest points of the system and their stability. Since we have a173
system of two equations, one on q and one on n, we can expect two nullclines174
obtained by calculation of the zero points of the equations.175
2.2 General form of the analyzed models176
Argasinski and Broom (2012) contains the derivation of both attracting null-177
clines for frequency, and density equations (described below) for the Hawk-Dove178
example, and the calculation of their intersections. However, a rigorous stabil-179
ity analysis was limited to the case when the system is in ecological equilibrium180
(Theorem 2 of that paper). In this paper we carry out the analysis of the gen-181
eral stability conditions free from this restriction, nd some surprising results,182
and demonstrate that the previous analysis is insu¢ cient to fully explain the183
behaviour of the system in some cases.184
In this section we start from the general dynamical system for two strategies185
from Argasinski and Broom (2012). Assume that q = (q1; 1 q1) is the vector of186
frequencies describing the strategic composition of the population. Then Vi(q)187
and si(q) = 1   di(q) describe the fertility and adult survival payo¤s related188
to the focal interactions, being the subject of game theoretical analysis. The189
logistic coe¢ cient
 
1  nK

describes the density dependent juvenile survival190
and background fertility  and mortality 	 describe the impact of other factors191
(such as other games involving other strategies or phenotypic traits). This leads192
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to the following general set of equations:193
_q1 = q1
0@(V1(q) X
j
qjVj(q))

1  n
K

+ (s1(q) 
X
j
qjsj(q))
1A ; (4)
_n = n
  
+
X
i
qiVi(q)
!
1  n
K

+
X
i
qisi(q)  1 	
!
; (5)
see Appendix 1 for a detailed derivation and description of possible specic
modelling approaches that can be considered with the above general frame-
work). Then ~q(n) is the nullcline of equation (4), ~n(q) is the nullcline of equa-
tion (5) and their intersection is the point (n^; q^). To analyse the underlying
dynamics, the above system can be presented in the most general form with-
out the distinction between focal interactions, described by game payo¤s, and
the background fertility and mortality rates. Then the system (4,5) can be
denoted in terms of general birth and death rates, B1(q) = V1(q) +   0
and M1(q) = 1   s1(q) + 	  0 (since fecundities and mortalities are always
non-negative) describing the demographic outcomes of all interactions (includ-
ing focal game payo¤s and background payo¤s  and 	 respectively). Then
B(q) = qB1(q) + (1   q)B2(q)  0 and M(q) = qM1(q) + (1   q)M2(q)  0
are the mean general fecundity and mortality, respectively. This leads to the
system:
_q1 = g(n; q) = q1
 
B1(q)  B(q)
 
1  n
K

   M1(q)  M(q) ; (6)
_n = f(n; q) = n

B(q)

1  n
K

  M(q)

; (7)
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where equation (6) is written focusing on the rst strategy; an analogous equa-194
tion would denote the frequency of the second strategy. We will also use the195
auxiliary terms (as we see in the associated appendices), ru(q) = B(q)  M(q)196
which is the rate of unsuppressed growth and L = B(q)= M(q) which is the197
turnover coe¢ cient.198
2.3 Properties of the stationary points related to the turnover199
of individuals200
In many models ~q(n) and ~n(q) dened as the respective nullclines will exist (in201
some cases they will be attracting nullclines). Expressing q as a function of n202
(according to the implicit function theorem), the nullcline ~q(n) is dened by203
the value of q for which g(n; q) = 0 (the right-hand side of equation (6) is 0204
for any given n). It is possible that there is more than one such solution, and205
so more than one such nullcline. Similarly, expressing n as a function of q for206
f(n; q) = 0, the nullcline ~n(q) is dened by the value of n for which the right-207
hand side of equation (7) is 0 for any given q. The nullclines, representing the208
equilibria of interplaying processes (strategic selection and convergence to the209
ecological equilibrium) will play important roles in the derivation of the static210
game theoretic conditions (the inequalities for payo¤s of the strategies that211
should be satised for evolutionary stability). Those conditions will extend the212
classical ESS concept to the ecological concept. In addition, on the nullcline213
representing the equilibria of one process, the dynamics is determined by the214
opposite process, for example on the density nullcline the dynamics is driven215
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by game dynamics only. The question arises, when can the behaviour of the216
complicated dynamical system be described by a set of algebraic inequalities?217
Now let us analyze the properties of the stationary points of systems of218
this type. In classical evolutionary game theory, at the stationary points (a219
Nash equilibria) there is equality of tness among all strategies present in the220
population; we note that this property becomes trivial after the addition of221
density dependence since all growth rates are equal to zero at the stationary222
states. The new framework presented here is dened with respect to fertility223
and mortality separately. Thus the question arises: is there a characterization224
of the stationary points in the new theory equivalent to the equality of tness225
in classical theory? Here the notion of the turnover coe¢ cient Bi(q)=Mi(q),226
describing the number of newborn candidates replacing a single dead individual,227
should be recalled. The name turnover coe¢ cientwas introduced, and the228
properties of this term were analyzed, in Argasinski and Broom (2013). Similar229
notions can be found in older papers, for example in Rosenzweig and MacArthur230
(1963) and Cheng (1981), and an analogous notion describing the ratio of energy231
allocated to reproduction to mortality can be found in papers related to life232
history theory (Taylor and Williams, 1984; Koz÷owski, 1992 and 1996; Werner233
and Anholt, 1993; Perrin and Sibly, 1993; for an overview see Koz÷owski, 2006).234
The turnover coe¢ cient can be useful for the characterization of the stationary235
points of the dynamics even in the general case of k strategies (not only two as236
in the other results in this paper). This is summarized by Theorem 1 below.237
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Theorem 1238
Any intersection of the nullclines is an equilibrium point, and at such an239
intersection:240
a) The turnover coe¢ cients of all strategies are equal:
Bi(q)
Mi(q)
=
Bj(q)
Mj(q)
=
B(q)
M(q)
: (8)
b) The focal game-specic demographic payo¤s Vi(q) and si(q) satisfy the241
following condition242
Vi(q)
M(q)
B(q)
  (1  si(q)) = Vj(q)
M(q)
B(q)
  (1  sj(q)) : (9)
243
For a proof see Appendix 2.244
Condition b) can be interpreted as equality of the suppressed Malthusian245
growth rates related to the focal game (and one divided by the population246
average turnover coe¢ cient M(q)= B(q) = (1   s(q) + 	)=( V (q) + ) is the247
density dependent juvenile recruitment survival probability). Note that this248
property should be satised in general for any number of strategies.249
Corollary 1250
If the focal game-specic turnover coe¢ cients satisfy
Vi(q)
(1  si(q)) =
Vj(q)
(1  sj(q)) =
B(q)
M(q)
; (10)
then the relationship from point b) is satised (but not necessarily vice versa).251
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Thus the condition of equality of the turnover coe¢ cients can be extended on252
the focal game payo¤ functions, but it is not general. We can imagine stationary253
points where point b) from Theorem 1 is satised but there are no equality of254
the focal game turnover coe¢ cients. A question arises about the stability of255
the stationary points where all strategies have equal turnover coe¢ cient. For256
the general case this can be very complex, thus we start from the basic models257
and focus on the stability of the stationary states for two competing strategies.258
Consider the phase space q  n, consisting of all possible values of q and n. On259
the nullclines ~q(n) and ~n(q) the right-hand side of the equations (6) and (7)260
respectively equals zero, and these nullclines divide the phase space into regions261
of growth and decline for q and n. When the right-hand side of equation (6) is262
negative we have that q > ~q (n) is the region of decline for q.263
We note that in the method of static game theoretic analysis presented in264
Argasinski and Broom (2012), the attractor population size ~n(q) was substi-265
tuted into the right hand side of equation (6). Substitution of ~n(q) into ~q (n)266
leads to the inequality q < (>)~q (~n) describing the regions of growth (decline)267
of q lying on the density nullcline ~n(q). In Argasinski and Broom (2012) the268
inequality q  ~q (~n) has the form of a quadratic equation (see Theorem 2 and269
Appendix 5 there). Zeros of this equation are intersections of the density and270
frequency attracting nullclines. Thus under the assumption of ecological equi-271
librium, this method shows which intersection is stable and unstable. This is272
a rigorous analysis but it is strictly limited to the attracting density nullcline.273
The question arises, when can this reasoning be extended to the neighbourhood274
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of the attracting density nullcline? There are relationships between the density275
and frequency nullclines, but these cannot necessarily be extrapolated to the276
general neighbourhood of their intersections. This is summarized by technical277
Lemma 1 below, where we assume the standard notation for partial derivatives278
gq = @g=@q, gn = @g=@n, fq = @f=@q and fn = @f=@n of the right hand sides279
of equations (6,7).280
Lemma 1281
Assume that the attracting density nullcline and frequency nullcline exist282
and they intersect. Then:283
a) if gq(n; ~q(n)) < 0 (the frequency nullcline is an attractor of the frequency284
dynamics) then if the intersection is stable (unstable) on the density nullcline,285
it is stable (unstable) on the frequency nullcline.286
b) if gq(n; ~q(n)) > 0 (the frequency nullcline is a repeller of the frequency287
dynamics) then if the intersection is stable (unstable) on the density nullcline,288
it is unstable (stable) on the frequency nullcline.289
For a proof see Appendix 3.290
Thus in the case when the frequency nullcline is the attractor of the frequency291
dynamics, which implies that in the density independent case it will be a stable292
rest point, stability on the attracting density nullcline can be extrapolated to the293
attracting frequency nullcline. This property can be useful for the derivation294
of the static conditions for Eco-Evolutionary stability. Part b) of Lemma 1295
shows that the general situation is more complicated. It shows that in the296
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case of an unstable frequency nullcline the selection process and the ecological297
process will always act antagonistically. If one process will lead to stabilization298
of the rest point the second process will act towards destabilization. Thus299
we need some additional criteria describing this antagonistic relationship. The300
potential complexity of behaviour will be shown by numerical examples in the301
next section.302
2.4 Numerical examples and their analysis303
This section contains numerical simulations of the updated Hawk-Dove game304
(52,53) (see Appendix 4 for details) to show the dynamics induced by the305
eco-evolutionary feedback mechanism. For simplicity we set the background306
fertility  to be equal to zero. In Theorem 2 in Argasinski and Broom (2012)307
the local stability of intersections on the stable density nullcline for the Hawk-308
Dove game was analyzed. However the trajectories of the population away from309
this nullcline prior to convergence are also interesting and will have ecological310
interpretations. In Argasinski and Broom (2012) numerical simulations showed311
the interplay between selection dynamics and the dynamics of the population312
size. It was shown that ecological dynamics can seriously a¤ect the rules of313
the game while frequency dynamics determine the population size. This was314
mechanistically explained in that paper by the impact of density dependent315
juvenile mortality. In this section we will focus on the relationship between316
the trajectories, population size and the geometry of the attracting nullclines317
~q(n) and ~n(q), to reveal new details of this process which were not shown in318
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Argasinski and Broom (2012).319
FIGURE 1 HERE320
FIGURE 2 HERE321
FIGURE 3 HERE322
FIGURE 4 HERE323
In Argasinski and Broom (2012) results of the numerical simulations em-324
phasized the role of the intersections of both nullclines. In this paper we want325
to show the trajectories prior to convergence. To emphasize the role of both326
nullclines, in Figures 1-4, model parameters are chosen to set both intersections327
at values of frequencies q close to 0 and 1. This allows us to maximize the area328
falling between the nullclines which are very close to each other in the cases329
when intersections are relatively close (see for example Figure 4). Some of the330
numerical simulations support the intuition that the dynamics converge to the331
close neighbourhood of the attracting density nullcline and then trace the equi-332
librium size value (Figure 1). In this case the assumption from Argasinski and333
Broom (2012) of the population taking the stable size for a given frequency is334
justied.335
However, this happens when both nullclines are placed at relatively high336
densities. At lower densities the trajectory does not reach a strict neighbour-337
hood of the attracting density nullcline (Figure 2), but converges to a surface338
lying between the frequency and density nullclines. At very low densities the339
trajectories converge to the attracting nullcline which is closer to the frequency340
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attracting nullcline (Figure 3). We note that this e¤ect is suppressed by pop-341
ulation growth. In some cases the attracting nullcline is located in the close342
neighbourhood of the frequency attracting nullcline and traces it nearly to the343
equilibrium (Figure 4). Thus, the assumption that frequency selection occurs344
on the attracting density nullcline can sometimes be seriously wrong. In the345
general case the geometry of both nullclines plays an important role in the dy-346
namics and what happens in the region limited by those surfaces is crucial. At347
higher densities there is a stronger convergence towards the attracting density348
nullcline while at lower densities there is a stronger attraction towards the fre-349
quency attracting nullcline. Therefore, the ecological equilibrium assumption is350
a simplication of the full problem. In addition, on all gures we can observe351
the clearly visible convergence of the trajectories to the unique invariant man-352
ifold. However, the behaviour on these manifolds seems to be compatible with353
the projection of the vector eld on the nullcline ~n(q) (and also by Lemma 1354
on the nullcline ~q(n)). This suggests that the stability of the intersection can355
be described by a simple set of algebraic equations, which will constitute the356
Eco-Evolutionary static analysis.357
Note that in the above examples the attracting frequency nullcline represents358
the set of game theoretic Nash equilibria, conditional on the actual ecological359
conditions represented by juvenile mortality, determined by population size.360
However, we have two types of intersection representing the stationary points.361
One is stable, thus it is compatible with the underlying purely game theoretic362
notions, while the second is unstable. This means that a point that is a stable363
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equilibrium in the density independent case can be destabilized by ecological364
factors. However, we can imagine the opposite situation, where the intersection365
of the repelling frequency nullcline (representing the set of invasion barriers con-366
ditional on the actual population size) can be stabilized by the impact of density367
dependence. This is illustrated by the following phenomenological example:368
Example 1: the stabilization of a stationary point by density de-369
pendent pressure in case of the repelling frequency nullcline.370
Assume that there are two strategies, where the functions
B1(q) =

2
3
q2 +
2
3
q

and M1(q) =

7
9
  q
3

are the fertility and mortality of the rst strategy, while
B2(q) =
2
3
q2 and M2(q) =

4
9
  q
3

are those of the second. This leads to the following replicator equation (see
Appendix 5 for detailed derivation):
_q =
q
3
(1  q) ((2q   1)) ; (11)
where q = 1=2 is the unstable rest point (invasion barrier). However when we371
extend this model to the density dependent case, the situation is di¤erent. We372
obtain:373
_q =
q
3
(1  q) (2q(1  n=K)  1) ; (12)
_n =
4
3
n

q2(1  n=K)  1
3

: (13)
Calculation of the frequency and density nullclines gives:374
~q =
1
2(1  n=K) and ~n =

1  1
3q2

K.375
376
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Thus on the density nullcline juvenile mortality is 1  ~n=K = 1=3q2, leading377
to the stationary state q^ = 2=3 and the respective population size n^ = K=4378
(juvenile mortality is 1   n^=K = 3=4). This example clearly shows that the379
frequency nullcline need not be attracting for the stability of the respective in-380
tersection with the attracting density nullcline to hold (see Figure 5).381
FIGURE 5 HERE382
In this case there is no convergence of the trajectories to the unique manifold.383
Figure 5 shows that in the neighbourhood of the nullclines there is a spiral at-384
traction to the intersection. However, below the nullclines there is a huge region385
of extinction and convergence to the frequency 0. This pattern is caused by the386
fact that at low densities pressure from the frequency dynamics is stronger than387
that from the density dynamics. Thus at low population sizes, the frequency388
nullcline acts as the invasion barrier as in the case of unlimited growth. How-389
ever, this is caused by the decrease of the population size induced by the density390
dynamics. This leads to an emergence of the additional boundary between the391
basins of attraction. This boundary cannot be justied by any existing condition392
for evolutionary stability. Thus the dynamics can produce patterns that cannot393
be classied by known static ESS notions, and in this case the full analysis of394
the dynamic model should be carried out.395
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2.5 General stability conditions396
The examples presented above suggest the necessity of a general stability analy-
sis. This will enable extrapolation of the stability analysis of the Hawk-Dove
example from Argasinski and Broom (2012) to the general neighbourhood of
the intersection, not limited to the attracting density nullcline. Coordinates
of the intersection are (n^; q^). Stability along the attracting density nullcline is
described by the directional derivative (a total derivative expressed in terms of
our four partial derivatives)
dg(~n(q); q)
dq
= gq(n^; q^)  gn(n^; q^) fq(n^; q^)
fn(n^; q^)
: (14)
397
Below, by application of standard linearization methods we will derive the398
general stability conditions for intersections of the nullclines:399
Theorem 2400
If for the system described by equations (6) and (7), nullclines ~q(n) and ~n(q)401
exist, then:402
The intersection is stable if the following EESS (Eco-Evolutionarily Stable
State) conditions are satised:
a)
gq(n^; q^) < jfn(n^; q^)j ; (15)
b)
dg(~n(q); q)
dq
< 0: (16)
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For a proof see Appendix 6.404
A question arises about the interpretation of the above stability conditions.405
Condition a) means that attraction to the density nullcline is stronger than406
repellence from the frequency nullcline. This means that in the antagonistic407
relationship between selection and the ecological process indicated by point b)408
of Lemma 1, the stabilizing ecological process should be stronger. If the null-409
cline ~q(n) is attracting (which means that it consists of stable Nash equilibria)410
then condition a) is satised automatically. Condition b) is equivalent to sta-411
bility along the density nullcline ~n(q). Thus for the attracting nullcline ~q(n)412
the stability of the global equilibrium is equivalent to the behaviour along the413
nullcline ~n(q). This justies the static ESS analysis based on the substitution of414
the ecological equilibrium ~n(q) to the dynamics and the analysis of signs of the415
right hand sides of the q equations as in Theorem 2 in Argasinski and Broom416
(2012). Note that, according to Lemma 1, condition b) implies instability on417
the repelling nullcline ~q(n), representing the game theoretic invasion barriers.418
However, in this case, if the attraction towards nullcline ~n(q) is stronger than419
the repellence from nullcline ~q(n), then the intersection can be stable despite420
this. Note that for the intersection of the repelling frequency nullcline and den-421
sity nullcline from Example 1, both conditions are satised (see Appendix 7422
for the detailed calculations). According to Lemma 1, satisfying condition b)423
implies attraction towards the intersection along the attracting frequency null-424
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cline ~q(n) and repellence if the frequency nullcline ~q(n) is repelling. Example425
1 supports the results from Lemma 1. The projection of the ow orthogonal426
to the density nullcline (see arrows on Figure 6) shows that it will be stable,427
while on the frequency nullcline it will be unstable. However the general spiral428
dynamics cannot be reduced to convergence along one of the nullclines.429
Note that the ow is horizontal on the frequency nullcline and vertical on the
density nullcline. Thus the orthogonal projection of the ow is determined by
the slope of the respective nullcline. We shall assume that in the neighbourhood
of the intersection functions g and f are locally invertible, so that there is a 1-
1 correspondence between n and q, at least in the vicinity of a root. This
will be true for essentially any biological system, as situations where this is
not so, corresponding to nullclines slopes with zero or innite gradient, are
examples of so-called non-generic games, see e.g. Broom and Rychtar, 2013).
This means that both stability conditions can be interpreted in terms of slopes
of the nullclines. The slope of the frequency nullcline is
Uq =
dg(g 1(0; q^); q^)
dq
; (17)
and the slope of the size nullcline is
Un =
df(f 1(0; q^); q^)
dq
: (18)
Then the above conditions are equivalent to the following lemma:430
Lemma 2431
24
Provided that the inverses from equations (17) and (18) exist, Condition432
a) from Theorem 2 is clearly satised when gq(n^; q^)  0. For gq(n^; q^) > 0, we433
require the following condition to be satised:434
gn(n^; q^) is negative (positive) and :
Uq < (>)
n^
q^
 
B1(q^)= B(q^)  1
 : (19)
435
Condition b) is satised when gn(n^; q^) is negative (positive) and:436
Un > (<)Uq: (20)
437
For a proof see Appendix 8.438
Note that the right hand side of the condition (19) depends only upon the439
fertility stage; the mortality payo¤s are not present there.440
2.6 Game theoretic notions revealed by dynamic stability441
conditions442
Now let us take the game theoretic perspective and analyze the above statements443
from the strategic point of view. To do this we should describe the above444
conditions in terms of general payo¤ functions explicitly and then we should445
extract the focal game payo¤s from the background payo¤s in the conditions446
obtained. The following notion known from economics is useful:447
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Denition 1: The semi-elasticity of the function f(x) at point x is
df(x)=dx
f(x)
; (21)
which describes the change in f(x) scaled by its absolute value.448
This concept can be generalized to the case of convex combination of func-449
tions
P
qifi(x), as follows.450
Denition 2: The partial semi-elasticity of the function fi(x) with respect
to
P
qifi(x) at point x is
dfi(x)=dxP
qifi(x)
; (22)
which describes the equivalent scaled change in
P
qifi(x) caused by the451
component fi(x).452
Now we can derive the general stability conditions for the dynamics in the453
form (6,7) expressed in terms of general demographic payo¤s. This is done in454
the following theorem455
Theorem 3456
Condition a) has the form:
q^
  
B01(q^)  B0(q^)

B(q^)
 
 
M 01(q^)  M 0(q^)

M(q^)
!
<
B(q^)
M(q^)
  1; (23)
where
B(q^)
M(q^)
 1 describes the reproductive surplus, following Denition 1,
B0(q^)
B(q^)
457
is the semi-elasticity of B and following Denition 2,
B01(q^)
B(q^)
is the partial semi-458
elasticity of B with respect to B1 (for mortalities M1(q^) and M(q^) we have459
analogous notions).460
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Condition b) is satised when the semielasticities in payo¤s satisfy the fol-
lowing condition:

B01(q^)
B1(q^)
 
B0(q^)
B(q^)

 

M 01(q^)
M1(q^)
 
M 0(q^)
M(q^)

< 0: (24)
where
B01(q^)
B1(q^)
is the semi-elasticity of B1 (similarly for M1).461
For a proof see Appendix 9.462
Note that both conditions resemble the bracket structure of the right hand
side of the replicator equations, or rather derivatives of it. The di¤erence is
that both conditions are expressed in terms of semi-elasticities and partial semi-
elasticities instead of standard derivatives of payo¤ functions. The above con-
ditions are not expressed with respect to the focal games payo¤s. Thus they
should be extracted from general payo¤s B1(q^) and M1(q^). In e¤ect we obtain:
B1(q) = V1 +  0 and M1(q) = 1  s1 +	, so that inequalities (23) and (24)
become
q^
  
V 01(q^)  V 0(q^)

V (q^) + 
+
(s01(q^)  s0(q^))
1  s(q^) + 	
!
<
V (q^) + 
1  s(q^) + 	   1 (25)
and

V 01(q^)
V1(q^) + 
 
V 0(q^)
V (q^) + 

+

s01(q^)
1  s1(q^) + 	  
s0(q^)
1  s(q^) + 	

< 0: (26)
Since the background payo¤s  and 	 do not depend on the traits under463
consideration they should not depend on the frequency of the strategies in the464
focal games. In e¤ect they vanish from the derivatives of the general growth465
rates B andM . However they are still present in the stability conditions. Thus,466
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the stability in the particular focal type of interaction is determined by the467
impact of other activities. Since  = WB , 	 = mB where  describes the468
average number of background events between two focal events, and WB and469
mB are average background events fertility and mortality, parameters  and470
	 have a clear interpretation in the purely static ESS models too. This result471
can be important for the research on animal personalities (Dall et al., 2004;472
Wolf et al., 2007; Wolf and Weissing, 2010; Wolf and Weissing, 2012; Wolf and473
McNamara, 2012).474
The above results seriously alter our understanding of the self-regulation475
mechanism in evolving populations showing the role of density dependent growth476
limiting factors. They also suggest the relationship between the ESS approach477
and some concepts already present in the debate on evolutionary ecology. We478
can mechanistically interpret the stable and unstable intersections in terms479
of eco-evolutionary feedback (Post and Palkovacs, 2009; Kokko and López-480
Sepulcre, 2007).481
In the game theoretic framework this concept can be found in Argasin-482
ski and Koz÷owski (2008), Zhang and Hui (2011) and Argasinski and Broom483
(2012). How does this mechanism work? Perturbation in q (described by484
q) induces convergence towards the respective stable size ~n(q^ + q) lying485
on the attracting density nullcline ~n(q) which determines the respective fre-486
quency attractor ~q(~n(q^ + q)) on the frequency attracting nullcline ~q(n). If487
j~q(~n(q^ +q))  q^j < jqj then negative feedback is induced in a sense that dy-488
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namics chase ~q(~n(q^+q)) towards q^. In e¤ect q^ is stable. On the other hand, if489
j~q(~n(q^ +q))  q^j > jqj then a positive feedback is induced and the attractor490
escapes from q^. In e¤ect q^ is unstable. See Figure 6 for an illustration.491
FIGURE 6 HERE492
3 Discussion493
The results presented in this paper show the importance of the impact of growth494
limiting factors on selection mechanisms. Using strategically neutral density de-495
pendence, the results introduced in Argasinski and Broom (2012) and developed496
in Argasinski and Broom (submitted) have been claried and completed by rig-497
orous stability conditions. We have proved that in the case when both the498
frequency and density nullclines are attracting, results on the local stability of499
the nullcline intersections on the attracting density nullcline can be extended500
to the attracting frequency nullcline and vice versa (Lemma 1). In addition,501
instead of equality of growth rates at the stable points, under the inuence of502
density dependence we have equality of the turnover coe¢ cients (the number of503
newborn candidates produced per single dead adult individual) as was shown504
by Theorem 1.505
Theorem 2 shows the stability conditions. It shows that the stability along506
the attracting density nullcline can be extrapolated to the neighbourhood of507
the intersection (Theorem 2 point b). Those conditions show that stability de-508
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pends on the condition similar to the classical ESS notions but expressed in509
absolute value changes in mortalities and fertilities (Theorem 3). In addition,510
the stability is determined by the geometry of both nullclines (Lemma 2). It511
is shown that the dynamics can be attracted by the intersection even in the512
case when the frequency nullcline is repelling. This can happen when attrac-513
tion toward the density nullcline is stronger than repellence from the frequency514
nullcline. Numerical simulations show a variety of behaviours. Some of these515
are against intuition based upon the dynamics concentrated on frequencies oc-516
curring on the attracting density nullcline. At low densities there is a stronger517
attraction towards the attracting frequency nullcline. This is caused by the fact518
that at high densities di¤erences in fertility are suppressed by density depen-519
dent juvenile mortality described by the logistic suppression coe¢ cient, while520
at low densities the impact of fertility on the overall dynamics is signicant.521
Thus both nullclines are important for the dynamics. In particular, the case of522
convergence to the intersection of the repelling frequency nullcline (which will523
be an invasion barrier in the case with unlimited growth) with the attracting524
density nullcline is surprising. In addition, this intriguing pattern coexists with525
a region of extinction that cannot be easily shown by purely static analysis.526
The phenomenon of stability and instability of the intersections can be mech-527
anistically explained by the idea of eco-evolutionary feedbacks, a concept already528
known in the literature (Post and Palkovacs, 2009; Kokko and López-Sepulcre,529
2007). The stability or instability of the particular stationary frequency is530
caused by a shift of the frequency attractor conditional on a corresponding531
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correction of the density attractor. This density attractor is conditional on532
the perturbation of the frequency, which closes the feedback loop. This is re-533
lated to the fact that in the framework presented in this paper outcomes of534
interactions, described by mortality and fertility, are entries of the nest site535
lotterymechanism, when the trajectory reaches a close neighbourhood of the536
density nullcline. Thus on the density nullcline all newborns introduced to the537
environment form a pool of candidates from which individuals that substitute538
dead adults in their nest sites will be randomly drawn. This mechanism in-539
duces the frequency dependent selection consisting of two stages. At the rst540
stage the strategies maximizing the turnover coe¢ cient (number of newborns541
produced per single dead adult within a short time interval) are selected. Then542
every perturbation of the population state (a size decrease caused by natural543
disaster or invasion of a signicant number of suboptimal mutants) leads to an544
increase of the frequency of the strategy with maximal mortality among those545
with maximal turnover coe¢ cient. This mechanism was analyzed in Argasinski546
and Broom (2013). Note that the framework analyzed in this paper collapses to547
the system analyzed in Argasinski and Broom (2013) under the assumption that548
all mortality and fertility payo¤s are constants. The nest site lottery mechanism549
was analyzed only for the case when the population is in the neighbourhood of550
the density nullcline. Thus it is an interesting open question how this mecha-551
nism works in states far from the density nullcline. It is likely that when there552
is a shortage of free nest sites the population is subject to a similar mechanism.553
This fraction increases with convergence to the density attracting nullcline and554
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covers all newborns when the trajectory reaches this nullcline. The importance555
of the generalization of the nest site lottery mechanism is supported by results556
from this paper.557
Our results show an example of the mechanism shaping the ecology of the558
population according to the aggregated outcomes of particular individual in-559
teractions of di¤erent types. This point of view relies on and provides detailed560
theoretical justication for the classical ideas proposed by ×omnicki (1988), that561
ecological and evolutionary reasoning should be based at the level of individuals.562
Another important aspect of our work is the emphasis on the key role of growth563
limiting factors in selection mechanisms. This is an important contribution to564
current developments in evolutionary theory focused on the relationships be-565
tween selection processes and ecological factors (Schoener, 2011; Morris, 2011;566
Pelletier.et al., 2009). The mechanism of the eco-evolutionary feedback shown567
in this paper is a good example of the impact of ecological factors, such as568
growth limitation, on the outcomes of the selection process. The importance569
of growth limiting mechanisms implies that future research should investigate570
more detailed mechanistic models of these factors, since the current literature571
is dominated by the phenomenological logistic approach, which was also used572
in this paper. Another important direction of research indicated by the results573
presented in this paper is the generalization of the eco-evolutionary stability574
conditions to the multidimensional case, describing the competition between575
more than two strategies. It is likely that signicant complexity will arise from576
these generalizations, which in turn could reveal novel ecological predictions.577
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Table 1: Important symbols.700
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n population size
qi frequency of the i-th strategy
K carrying capacity (maximal environmental load)
Wi(q) fertility payo¤ of the i-th strategy
si(q) prereproductive survival payo¤ function of the i-th strategy
Vi =
P
j qjsi(ej)Wi(ej) mortality-fertility trade-o¤ function (example of fertility payo¤)
1 rate of occurrence (intensity) of the game event
2 rate of occurrence of the background event
WB average background event fertility
mB = 1  bB average background event mortality
 = 2=1 average number of background events between two focal events
 = WB rate of the average background fertility
	 = mB rate of background mortality
g(n; q) Function describing the right hand side of the frequency equation
f(n; q) Function describing the right hand side of the population size equation
V1(q) General fertility payo¤ related to the focal events of the rst strategy
s1(q) General survival payo¤ related to the focal events of the rst strategy
B1(q) = V1 + General fertility factor of all events of the rst strategy
M1(q) = 1  s1 +	 General mortality factor of all events of the rst strategy
B(q) = qB1 + (1  q)B2 Average fertility factor
M(q) = qM1 + (1  q)M2 Average mortality factor
ru(q) = B(q)  M(q) Rate of the unsuppressed growth
S Hawk-Dove example survival payo¤ matrix
F =WP Hawk-Dove example fertility payo¤ matrix
d = 1  s probability of death during a contest in a Hawk-Dove game
~q(n) frequency nullcline
~n(q) density nullcline
701
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Appendix 1702
This section contains some details from Argasinski and Broom (2012) and Ar-703
gasinski and Broom (submitted). Wi(q) is the focal game fertility payo¤ function704
of the i-th strategy, si(q) is the pre-reproductive mortality payo¤ function of the705
i-th strategy. Further, Vi(q) =
P
j qjsi(ej)Wi(ej) is the mortality-fertility trade-706
o¤ function for the case when si andWi are frequency dependent, although more707
complicated functions are also possible (Argasinski and Broom, 2012). In Ar-708
gasinski and Broom (2012) the classical approach to the background tness was709
generalized to the case of two demographic payo¤ functions. It was described710
by the phenomenological elements of the payo¤s (additive fertility and mul-711
tiplicative post-reproductive mortality), which a¤ect the dynamics. However,712
in this paper we will use an alternative approach from Argasinski and Broom713
(submitted) which has clear mechanistic interpretation and better describes the714
distribution of the background interactions in time. Assume that the modelled715
interaction described by the game theoretic structure occurs at intensity 1.716
Other events shaping the fertility and mortality occur at the separate intensity717
2 and during the average background event WB newborns are produced and718
adult individuals die with probability mB . This leads to the following general719
growth equations:720
_ni = ni1Vi(q)

1  n
K

 ni1(1  si(q)) +ni2WB

1  n
K

 ni2mB (27)
721
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= ni1

Vi(q)

1  n
K

  (1  si(q)) + 2
1
WB

1  n
K

  2
1
mB

: (28)
722
Then by change of timescale ~t = t1 and substitution using  =
2
1
WB and723
	 =
2
1
mB , we obtain:724
_ni = ni
h
Vi(q)

1  n
K

  (1  si(q)) + 

1  n
K

 	
i
; (29)
which leads to the general system of equations (4,5) and to the nullcline for
population size:
n(q) = K

1  	+ 1 
P
i qisi(q)
 +
P
i qiVi(q)

: (30)
It is attracting since the right hand side of (5) is a decreasing function725
of n. Thus the game theoretic stage can be very complex, since payo¤s in a726
modelled game Vi and si can have a structure describing several causal stages727
of the interaction (as was shown in Argasinski and Broom 2012). However728
all models of the basic and extended types can be presented in the following729
simplied general form, which are equations (4) and (5) where Vi(q) and si(q)730
describe potentially complicated fertility and mortality payo¤s related to the731
focal interactions. This allows us to keep a distinction between focal game and732
background payo¤s.733
41
Appendix 2734
Proof of Theorem 1:735
Assume a generalized n-dimensional version of system (6,7), where we have736
n individual strategies and the frequency dynamics dened on n 1 dimensional737
strategy simplex is completed by the following single equation for the population738
size:739
dn
dt
= f(n; q) = n

B(q)

1  n
K

  M(q)

: (31)
The bracketed term in equation (31) equals zero when

1  n
K

=
M(q)
B(q)
; (32)
which leads to
~n =

1 
M(q)
B(q)

K: (33)
Here we substitute this expression into equation (6), when the right hand740
side becomes741
dqi
dt
= qi
 
Bi(q)  B(q)
 M(q)
B(q)

   Mi(q)  M(q) (34)
= qi M(q)

Bi(q)
B(q)
  Mi(q)M(q)

: (35)
Thus at the intersection of the nullclines the bracketed term from equation
(35) should be equal to zero. This is satised when
Bi(q)
Mi(q)
=
B(q)
M(q)
; (36)
which means that the turnover coe¢ cients of all strategies should be equal.742
Thus point a) is proved.743
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Now focus on the role of the outcomes of the focal game. Then equality of
the turnover coe¢ cients can be described as
Vi(q) + 
1  si(q) + 	 =
Vj(q) + 
1  sj(q) + 	 =
B(q)
M(q)
: (37)
Assume auxiliary notation di(q) = 1  si(q). This implies that when Vi(q) 744
Vj(q) = xV and di(q)  dj(q) = xs, we have745
Vi(q) + 
di(q) + 	
=
Vi(q) + xV +
di(q) + xs +	
) (38)
Vi(q) + 
di(q) + 	
xs = xV : (39)
Thus from (37) and (39) we have
Vi(q)  Vj(q) =
B(q)
M(q)
(di(q)  dj(q)) (40)
leading to the following general condition which can be interpreted as equal-
ity of focal game specic suppressed Malthusian growth rates:
Vi(q)
M(q)
B(q)
  di(q) = Vj(q)
M(q)
B(q)
  dj(q): (41)
This is the proof of point b).746
Appendix 3747
Proof of Lemma 1:748
Assume that the dynamics is limited to the frequency attracting nullcline.
If we substitute the equilibrium of the size equation into the frequency equation
then the derivative of the right side of the frequency equation can be presented
43
as the directional derivative along the vector (
d~n
dq
; 1) tangent to the attracting
density nullcline. Since f : (n; q)! z is the function assigning the value of the
derivative z to each pair (n; q) describing the population state, then the inverse
function f 1 : (z; q)! n assigns size n to the respective pair (z; q) and can be
denoted as n(z; q). On the nullcline ~n(q) we have z = 0, and thus we obtain the
derivative
d~n
dq
in the following way. Since along the nullcline f(~n(q); q) = 0 the
derivative of it will also be equal to zero, leading to:
df(~n(q); q)
dq
= fq + fn
d~n(q)
dq
= 0) (42)
d~n(q)
dq
=   fq
fn
: (43)
Therefore, for the intersection point it will describe the derivative of the attract-
ing density nullcline ~n (a level set with z = 0). Thus the directional derivative
mentioned above can be presented as:
dg(~n(q); q)
dq
= gq   gn fq
fn
: (44)
If we assume that the dynamics is limited to the attracting density nullcline,
then by analogous derivation we can obtain:
df(n; ~q(n))
dn
= fn   fq gn
gq
: (45)
Note that the former derivative is just the latter multiplied by
gq
fn
. Since749
fn is always negative, the sign of this factor is determined by the sign of gq.750
Thus if gq < 0 (the frequency nullcline is attracting) then if the intersection751
is stable (unstable) on the density nullcline then it is stable (unstable) on the752
frequency nullcline. However, if gq > 0 (the frequency nullcline is repelling)753
44
then if the intersection is stable (unstable) on the density nullcline then it is754
unstable (stable) on the frequency nullcline.755
Appendix 4756
A Hawk-Dove example was used to illustrate the above, using the payo¤matrices
S (the mortality payo¤) and P , where the fertility matrix is F =WP , as follows
S =
0BBBBBB@
H D
H s 1
D 1 1
1CCCCCCA ; P =
0BBBBBB@
H D
H 0:5 1
D 0 0:5
1CCCCCCA ;
757
758
where s < 1 is the survival probability of a ght between Hawks, and the
fertility matrix containing the expected number of newborns W produced from
the interaction. When we substitute the above matrix payo¤s into equations
(4) and (5) as the general fertility payo¤ V (v; q) = vS  PqT and the pre-
reproductive survival payo¤ s(v; q) = vSqT respectively (where  is elementwise
multiplication of matrix entries) leading to strategy payo¤s Vi(v; q) = eiS PqT
and si(v; q) = eiSqT . In e¤ect we obtain the following system:
_qh = qh

1  n
K

W
 
e1S  PqT   qS  PqT

+ (e1Sq
T   qSqT )

(46)
and
_n = n
 
+ qS  PqTW  1  n
K

+ qSqT   1 	

; (47)
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where the matrix operations are as follows (Argasinski Broom 2012):759
e1Sq
T = sqh + 1  qh = qh(s  1) + 1; (48)
e1S  PqT = 0:5sqh + 1  qh; (49)
qSqT = qh (qh(s  1) + 1) + (1  qh) = 1  q2h(1  s); (50)
qS  PqT = qh (0:5sqh + 1  qh) + 0:5(1  qh)2 = 0:5
 
1  q2h(1  s)

:(51)
After calculations and the substitution d = 1   s the following equations
were obtained
_qh = qh (1  qh)

0:5W (1  qhd)

1  n
K

  qhd

; (52)
_n = n
 
+
 
1  q2hd

0:5W
 
1  n
K

  q2hd 	

: (53)
Two rest points of this system are qh = 0 and 1. A nontrivial rest point,760
which becomes the attracting nullcline for the density dependent case, (for de-761
tailed calculation see Argasinski and Broom, submitted) is given by762
~qh(n) =
0:5W

1  n
K

d

0:5W

1  n
K

+ 1
 : (54)
There is a stable population size at either ~n = 0 or the following positive rest
point which is conditional on the actual hawk strategy frequency (describing
the attracting nullcline parametrized by qh)
~n(qh) = K
 
1  1 + 	 
 
1  q2hd

+ 0:5W (1  q2hd)
!
: (55)
The intersections of the above nullclines constitute the rest-points of the763
system. For the above Hawk-Dove game there are two intersections. If it exists,764
the rst one is the stable mixed equilibrium which has the form765
46
q^h = (1 + 	) 
r
(1 + 	)
2   4	
d
; (56)
and the second (unstable) intersection is an invasion barrier for a stable pure766
Hawk equilibrium (where qh converges to Hawk if and only if qh > qh),767
qh = (1 + 	) +
r
(1 + 	)
2   4	
d
: (57)
Appendix 5768
Let us derive the replicator equations for Example 1. For the density indepen-769
dent case we have the following Malthusian growth rates770
ru1 (q) = B1(q) M1(q) =
2
3
q2 + q   7
9
;771
ru2 (q) = B2(q) M2(q) =
2
3
q2 +
q
3
  4
9
:772
This leads to the following replicator equation:773
_q = q(1  q)(ru1 (q)  ru2 (q)) =
q
3
(1  q) (2q   1)774
where q = 1=2 is the unstable rest point (invasion barrier). However when we775
extend this model to the density dependent case, the situation is di¤erent. Then776
the density dependent Malthusian growth rates are:777
r1(q; n) =

2
3
q2 +
2
3
q

(1  n=K) 

7
9
  q
3

;778
r2(q; n) =
2
3
q2(1  n=K) 

4
9
  q
3

:779
This leads to the replicator dynamics:780
_q = q(1  q)(r1   r2) = q
3
(1  q) (2q(1  n=K)  1) :781
47
Further we obtain the following equation for the mean payo¤782
r = qr1 + (1  q)r2 = 4
3
q2(1  n=K)  4
9
;783
leading to the di¤erential equation for the population size:784
_n = nr =
4
3
n

q2(1  n=K)  1
3

:
785
After calculation of the frequency and density nullclines we obtain:786
~q =
1
2(1  n=K) and ~n =

1  1
3q2

K.787
788
Thus on the density nullcline juvenile mortality is 1   n=K = 1=3q2. The789
intersection of the nullclines satises the equation q =
3q2
2
. The stationary790
state is thus q^ = 2=3 and respective population size n^ =
K
4
(juvenile mortality791
is 1  n^=K = 3
4
).792
Appendix 6793
Here we prove Theorem 2: in particular giving a derivation of general formulae794
for conditions a) and b) from the theorem.795
We consider the system in equations (6) and (7). Standard linearization
techniques can be applied. At the critical points n^; q^ we have f(n^; q^) = g(n^; q^) =
0. We need to consider each of the derivatives of f and g with respect to each
of q and n at the critical points, and in particular the Jacobian matrix0BB@ fn(n^; q^) fq(n^; q^)
gn(n^; q^) gq(n^; q^)
1CCA
48
and its eigenvalues. The eigenvalues of the Jacobian are found as follows.796
fn(n^; q^)   fq(n^; q^)
gn(n^; q^) gq(n^; q^)  
= 2 +A+ Z (58)
where A =  (fn(n^; q^) + gq(n^; q^)) (which leads to the condition from point b)797
and Z = fn(n^; q^)gq(n^; q^)  fq(n^; q^)gn(n^; q^). Thus:798
1;2 =
 ApA2   4Z
2
:
For stability we need either two negative eigenvalues or two complex eigen-799
values with negative real parts. This occurs when A > 0 and Z > 0.800
The condition Z > 0 is just condition b) from Theorem 2 and can be pre-801
sented in the form802
fn(n^; q^)

gq(n^; q^)  gn(n^; q^) fq(n^; q^)
fn(n^; q^)

> 0:803
Thus it is a product of fn(n^; q^) < 0 and the directional derivative along804
the attracting density nullcline
dg(~n(q); q)
dq
(see equation (44)) from Appendix805
3. Thus the condition b) is satised when this derivative is negative, i.e. the806
intersection is an attractor on the density nullcline (and, by Lemma 1, on the807
frequency attracting nullcline). This constitutes point b).808
The condition A > 0 occurs if fn(n^; q^) + gq(n^; q^) < 0. The rst of these809
two terms is negative; the second of these being negative is the condition for810
stability in density independent models. Thus, for example, the Hawk-Dove811
49
game which has a mixed ESS for its density independent version (the classical812
game) automatically satises this condition. However, the condition A > 0 can813
be satised even in the case when the frequency nullcline is repelling, which814
implies gq(n^; q^) > 0. Then this condition leads to gq(n^; q^) < jfn(n^; q^)j , since815
fn(n^; q^) is negative, which is condition a) from Theorem 2. Thus our conditions816
A > 0 and Z > 0 are precisely those from Theorem 2 as required.817
Appendix 7818
Below we will analyze stability in Example 1. The respective derivatives are:819
gq(q; n) =
1
3

(4q   6q2)(1  n=K)  (1  2q) ;820
gn(q; n) =
 2q2(1  q)
3K
;821
fq(q; n) =
4
3
(2qn(1  n=K)) ;822
fn(q; n) =
4
3

q2 (1  2n=K)  1
3

:823
After substitution of the rest points, we obtain:824
gq(q^; n^) =
1
9
> 0;825
gn(q^; n^) =   8
81K
;826
fq(q^; n^) =
K
3
;827
fn(q^; n^) =
4
3

2
9
  1
3

=   4
27
.828
Now the stability conditions a) A =  (fn(n^; q^) + gq(n^; q^)) > 0 and b)829
gq(n^; q^)  gn(n^; q^) fq(n^; q^)
fn(n^; q^)
< 0 from Theorem 2 should be checked.830
50
a)  

  4
27
+
3
27

=
1
27
> 0;831
b)
1
9
+
8
81K

 27K
12

=  1
9
< 0:832
Thus in the density dependent case the intersection of the invasion barrier833
and the attracting density nullcline is stable.834
Appendix 8835
Proof of Lemma 2:836
The four derivatives, necessary for the following work, are given by the following837
expressions:838
fn(n; q) = B(q)

1  2n
K

  M(q);839
fq(n; q) = n

B0(q)

1  n
K

  M 0(q)

;840
gn(n; q) =
 q  B1(q)  B(q)
K
;841
gq(n; q) =
 
B1(q)  B(q)
 
1  n
K

   M1(q)  M(q)842
+q
 
B01(q)  B0(q)
 
1  n
K

   M 01(q)  M 0(q) ;843
where B0i(q) is the derivative of Bi(q) w.r.t q, and similarly M
0
i(q) is the844
derivative ofMi(q) w.r.t q, for i = 1; 2 and for the non-indexed averaged payo¤s.845
846
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For stability we require (Condition A from Appendix 6) that
fn(n^; q^) + gq(n^; q^) < 0: (59)
On the density nullcline fn(n^; q^) < 0 thus for gq(n^; q^)  0 the condition (59)
is always satised. For gq(n^; q^) > 0 we require gq(n^; q^) <  fn(n^; q^). Dividing
(59) by  gn(n^; q^) we have the following conditions, when gn(n^; q^) is negative
(positive),
  gq(n^; q^)
gn(n^; q^)
< (>)
fn(n^; q^)
gn(n^; q^)
: (60)
This leads to:847
fn(n^; q^)
gn(n^; q^)
=
B(q^)

1  2n^
K

  M(q^)
 q^  B1(q^)  B(q^) =K = B(q^)n^q^  B1(q^)  B(q^) = n^q^ =  B1(q^)= B(q^)  1
since we know that B(q^)

1  n^
K

  M(q^) = 0 meaning the original denom-
inator reduces to   n^K B(q^). This leads to the condition
dg(g 1(0; q^); q^)
dq
< (>)
n^
q^
=
 
B1(q^)= B(q^)  1

; (61)
leading to condition a).848
Condition Z > 0 is satised when gn(n^; q^) is negative (positive) if
  fq(n^; q^)
fn(n^; q^)
> (<)  gq(n^; q^)
gn(n^; q^)
which is equivalent to
df(f 1(0; q^); q^)
dq
> (<)
dg(g 1(0; q^); q^)
dq
(62)
(this is possible when there is a 1-1 correspondence between n and q, at least849
in the vicinity of a root).850
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Appendix 9851
Proof of Theorem 3:852
Here we give a derivation of the detailed form of the formulae A and Z leading853
to the stability conditions expressed in terms of the payo¤ functions.854
The necessary derivatives are given in Appendix 8. After substitution of the855
stationary points q^ and n^ =

1 
M(q^)
B(q^)

K, we have856
fn(n^; q^) =  ru(q^);857
fq(n^; q^) =

1 
M(q^)
B(q^)

K

B0(q^)
 M(q^)
B(q^)

  M 0(q^)

858
= M(q^)

1 
M(q^)
B(q^)

K
 B0(q^)
B(q^)
 
M 0(q^)
M(q^)

;859
gn(n^; q^) =
 q^  B1(q^)  B(q^)
K
;860
gq(n^; q^) = q^
 
B01(q^)  B0(q^)
 M(q^)
B(q^)

   M 01(q^)  M 0(q^)861
= q^ M(q^)
  
B01(q^)  B0(q^)

B(q^)
 
 
M 01(q^)  M 0(q^)

M(q^)
!
;862
since the rst bracketed term equals zero.863
Let us calculate concrete forms of conditions A and Z:864
Condition A:865
A =  
 
M(q^)  B(q^) + q^ M(q^)
  
B01(q^)  B0(q^)

B(q^)
 
 
M 01(q^)  M 0(q^)

M(q^)
!!
=866
= B(q^)  M(q^)
 
1 + q^
  
B01(q^)  B0(q^)

B(q^)
 
 
M 01(q^)  M 0(q^)

M(q^)
!!
:867
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Then A > 0 when
B(q^)
M(q^)
  1 > q^
  
B01(q^)  B0(q^)

B(q^)
 
 
M 01(q^)  M 0(q^)

M(q^)
!
: (63)
Condition Z:868
Z = fn(n^; q^)gq(n^; q^)  fq(n^; q^)gn(n^; q^))869
Z =  

1 
M(q^)
B(q^)

B(q^)q^ M(q^)
  
B01(q^)  B0(q^)

B(q^)
 
 
M 01(q^)  M 0(q^)

M(q^)
!
870
+ M(q^)

1 
M(q^)
B(q^)
 B0(q^)
B(q^)
 
M 0(q^)
M(q^)

q^
 
B1(q^)  B(q^)

=871
= M(q^)q^

1 
M(q^)
B(q^)
" B0(q^)
B(q^)
 
M 0(q^)
M(q^)
 
B1(q^)  B(q^)
  B(q^)  B01(q^)  B0(q^)B(q^)872
 
 
M 01(q^)  M 0(q^)

M(q^)
!#
:873
Thus Z > 0 if874
 B0(q^)
B(q^)
 
M 0(q^)
M(q^)
  
B1(q^)  B(q^)

B(q^)
>
  
B01(q^)  B0(q^)

B(q^)
 
 
M 01(q^)  M 0(q^)

M(q^)
!
)875
 B0(q^)
B(q^)
 
M 0(q^)
M(q^)
  
B1(q^)  B(q^)

B(q^)
>

B01(q^)
B(q^)
  M
0
1(q^)
M(q^)

 
 B0(q^)
B(q^)
 
M 0(q^)
M(q^)

)876
 B0(q^)
B(q^)
 
M 0(q^)
M(q^)

>

B01(q^)
B1(q^)
  M
0
1(q^)
B(q^)
M(q^)B1(q^)

:877
From equality of the turnover coe¢ cients at the rest point we have that878
L = B1(q^)=M1(q^) = B(q^)= M(q^): This leads to
B(q^)
M(q^)B1(q^)
=
L
B1(q^)
=
1
M1(q^)
:879
Thus formula Z can be presented as:880
B0(q^)
B(q^)
 
M 0(q^)
M(q^)
>
B01(q^)
B1(q^)
  M
0
1(q^)
M1(q^)
881
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In e¤ect we obtain the classical condition but expressed in terms of semi-882
elasticities:883

B01(q^)
B1(q^)
 
B0(q^)
B(q^)

 

M 01(q^)
M1(q^)
 
M 0(q^)
M(q^)

< 0: (64)
884
End of proof.885
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FIGURE CAPTIONS886
Figure 1: The dynamics of a Hawk-Dove population. Initial conditions887
(qh(0) = 0:02; n(0) = 250), (qh(0) = 0:3; n(0) = 200) and (qh(0) = 0:7; n(0) = 300).888
Model parameters: W = 7, d = 0:5, 	 = 0:01. The trajectories converge to a889
nullcline lying in the very close neighbourhood of the attracting density null-890
cline and follows it converging to the mixed equilibrium q^h = 0:0202. The Hawk891
invasion barrier is qh = 0:9897. Thus in a stable mixed equilibrium there is ap-892
proximately one Hawk per 50 Doves and Hawks can take over a population if893
their number exceeds 100 per single Dove. The general ow is indicated by the894
arrows. Note that the orthogonal projection of the arrows lying on both null-895
clines will show the direction, along the respective nullcline, towards the stable896
intersection. This illustrates point a) from Lemma 1.897
Figure 2: The dynamics of a Hawk-Dove population. Initial conditions898
(qh(0) = 0:02; n(0) = 147), (qh(0) = 0:3; n(0) = 147) and (qh(0) = 0:6; n(0) = 147).899
Model parameters: W = 7, d = 0:8, 	 = 0:06. At lower densities conver-900
gence to the attracting density nullcline is not strong. The frequency attracting901
nullcline is passed by the trajectories which converge to the attracting surface902
placed between the density and frequency nullclines. The mixed equilibrium is903
q^h = 0:0762, while the Hawk invasion barrier is qh = 0:9837. The ow indicated904
by the arrows, as in the previous gure, supports the predictions from point a)905
of Lemma 1.906
Figure 3: The dynamics of a Hawk-Dove population. Initial conditions907
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(qh(0) = 0:02; n(0) = 147), (qh(0) = 0:3; n(0) = 147) and (qh(0) = 0:89; n(0) = 147).908
Model parameters: W = 0:8, d = 0:5, 	 = 0:01. In this case, the attracting909
nullcline lies close to the frequency nullcline at low densities but becomes closer910
to the density nullcline with an increase of the population size. At the beginning911
the trajectories pass the attracting density nullcline and converge to the stable912
surface in the neighbourhood of the attracting frequency nullcline, but then913
the trajectory leaves it slowly converging to the density nullcline. The mixed914
equilibrium is q^h = 0:0202, while the Hawk invasion barrier is qh = 0:9897: The915
ow indicated by the arrows, as in the previous gures, supports the predictions916
from point a) of Lemma 1.917
Figure 4: The dynamics of a Hawk-Dove population. Initial conditions918
(qh(0) = 0:2; n(0) = 20), (qh(0) = 0:87; n(0) = 2000) and (qh(0) = 0:9; n(0) = 450).919
Model parameters: W = 3, d = 0:9, 	 = 0:4. In this case the attracting null-920
cline lies in the very close neighbourhood of the attracting frequency nullcline921
and follows it almost to the mixed equilibrium q^h = 0:4865. The Hawk invasion922
barrier is qh = 0:9134. The ow indicated by the arrows, as in the previous923
gures, supports the predictions from point a) of Lemma 1.924
Figure 5: Trajectories of example 1, with an repelling frequency nullcline925
(evolutionarily unstable state for purely frequency dependent approach). In926
this case there are two basins of attraction: one is the intersection of the null-927
clines (the trajectory converges spirally) and the second is a region of extinction928
(convergence to n = 0 and q = 0). The border between the basins of attraction929
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was calculated numerically. Note that in this case, the orthogonal projection930
of the ow (indicated by the arrows) on the density nullcline shows a direction931
towards the stable intersection while the projection on the repelling frequency932
nullcline shows the opposite direction This illustrates point b) from Lemma 1.933
Figure 6: Presentation of the eco-evolutionary feedback mechanism. Posi-934
tive or negative feedback, caused by frequency perturbation q, is induced by935
the position of the density and frequency attractors ~n(q^+q) and ~q(~n(q^+q))936
towards the stationary point (intersection) q^; n^. Note that we consider a continu-937
ous system and not a sequential discrete system, and this gure is an illustration938
only. Other gures show that at relatively high densities attraction towards the939
attracting density nullcline is much stronger than attraction towards the at-940
tracting frequency nullcline.941
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